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 THE RHETORICAL THEORIES OF MALEBRANCHE:
 PERSUASION THROUGH IMITATION OR ATTENTION?
 By THOMAS M. CARR
 France's most prominent philosopher of the second half of the seventeenth century is
 reputed to be no friend of rhetoric. Bernard Tocanne declares, "C'est chez Malebran-
 che que se mettent en place tous les arguments mis en œuvre par les adversaires de la
 rhétorique à la fin du siècle,"1 and Peter France calls him "a philosopher who had no
 love for rhetoric."2 The basis of such judgments is the Oratorian's attacks in the Recher-
 che de la vérité (1674) against the use of the imagination and passions in the eloquence
 of Tertullian, Seneca, and Montaigne. Malebranche's critique is symptomatic of the le-
 gacy of Descartes' hostility toward rhetoric. The author of the Discours de la méthode
 had little use for the ancient discipline, scorning the degrees of probability accepted by
 rhetoricians as proof in favor of the évidence of clear and distinct ideas. Likewise, in
 theory at least, he saw no need for the rhetorician's concern for adapting his message to
 his audience: as Peter France has put it, Descartes' "first and constant notion of persua-
 sion" is that "he will state the truth firmly and clearly and everyone will agree."3
 However, it is an injustice to limit Malebranche's views on rhetoric to an amplifica-
 tion of the Cartesian stance. His other intellectual guide was Augustine, whose aban-
 donment of his role as a professional rhetorician upon his conversion, in no way signaled
 a lack of interest in rhetoric. To be sure, Malebranche condemns what I will call a "rhe-
 toric of imitation," which appeals to the body, and which is illustrated in its most potent
 form by "la communication contagieuse des imaginations fortes" (I. 320).4 Yet he also
 describes a second, more authentic model of persuasion, a "rhetoric of attention" which
 directs the mind to the Divine Reason in whom men see all truth. He depicts this method
 in action in dialogues like the Conversations chrétiennes (1677), the Entretiens sur la
 1 Bernard Tocanne, L'Idée de nature en France dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle (Paris:
 Klincksieck, 1978), p. 436. Tocanne's book offers an excellent survey of rhetorical theory of this
 period.
 Peter France, Rhetoric and Truth in France: Descartes to Diderot (Oxford University Press,
 1972), p. 29. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis seems to subscribe to the same view. For example in the no-
 tes to her recent edition of Malebranche's Œuvres, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), she remarks à
 propos a passage in the Conversations chrétiennes that he hesitated to "mettre la psychologie des
 passions au service d'une rhétorique persuasive" (p. 1765). Her extensive annotations point out a
 number of sources and parallels to Malebranche's comments on rhetoric.
 J France, p. 47.
 4 Nicolas Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, edited by André Robinet et al, 21 vols. (Paris: Vrin,
 1962-1970). AU quotations from Malebranche are from this edition. Citations refer to volume and
 page number.
Form Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur, Bd. 93, H. 1 (1983).
Copyright 1983, Franz Steiner Verlag. Used by permission.
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 métaphysique et sur la religion (1688), and the Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques
 (1683). These works, which envisage persuasion taking place under ideal conditions,
 contain both theoretical discussions of the communication process and practical advice
 on how to convert the obdurate.
 Readers familiar with other major thinkers of the period such as Pascal and Arnauld
 will recognize points of similarity. I believe they will also sense that, although Male-
 branche never attempted a comprehensive assessment of the art, his views on rhetoric
 and persuasion have a unique depth and subtlety due to his success in grounding his rhe-
 torical principles in a coherent analysis of the operation of the mind and its relation to
 the body. My goal in bringing together his scattered comments on rhetoric is not so
 much to study the sources of his views as to examine the epistemological and linguistic
 foundation of the two modes of persuasion he describes. We will see that while Carte-
 sian psycho-physiology furnished much of the rationale for his attacks against "fausse
 éloquence" (IL 259) of the rhetoric of imitation, his own theory of attention, reinforced
 by his concept of the Incarnation and the mind's union with God, made possible the
 more positive view illustrated in the dialogues.
 I
 His contrast in the Recherche between the evidence of reason and the verbal beauty of
 Seneca's language is representative of his strictures: "II faut bien distinguer la force & la
 beauté des paroles, de la force & de l'évidence des raisons. Il y a sans doute beaucoup de
 force, & quelque beauté dans les paroles de Seneque, mais il y a très peu de force &
 d'évidence dans ces raisons. Il donne par la force de son imagination un certain tour à
 ses paroles, qui touche, qui agite, & qui persuade par impression; mais il ne leur donne
 pas cette netteté, cette lumière pure, qui éclaire & qui persuade par évidence ... En un
 mot pourvu qu'il parle & qu'il parle bien, il se met peu en peine de ce qu'il dit . . ." (I.
 345). By linking eloquence to the body through the imagination and passions Male-
 branche makes it immediately suspect. This victory of the body over the mind exempli-
 fied by the seductive eloquence of Seneca can be analyzed at two levels - in the indi-
 vidual, where it dulls the attention which the mind requires to discover truth, and in its
 social dimension, where humans are transformed into machines persuading one another
 mechanically.
 In the individual, Malebranche locates the source of false eloquence in the perversion
 caused by original sin of the proper relationship between the body and the mind's two
 chief faculties, the understanding and the will. According to his version of Cartesian
 psycho-physiology, both the passions and sense perceptions depend on bodily func-
 tions, and their legitimate role is limited to activating the mind in the interest of the
 body. The senses provide information to the understanding about the relation of objects
 in the material world to the body, warning of dangers and identifying potential benefits,
 while the passions excite the will to action for the good of the body. Before the Fall of
 Adam, the senses and passions were content with just this minimal role, leaving the
 mind free to pursue its union with God (III. 72-73), but original sin has altered this rela-
 tion between mind and body. The mind's previous control has become a state of depen-
 dence, and the passions and sense perceptions now overstep their bounds and lead the
 mind into precipitous judgments and thus error.
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 The passions pose a special danger to the will's double task of suspending the judg-
 ment and focusing the attention until the overwhelming certainty of clear and distinct
 ideas is achieved. Ever since the Fall, the passions have had such a strong attraction on
 the will that they can take hold of it, upsetting its concentration. Style itself can act as
 just such a pander. Malebranche's example shows how insidious this appeal to the pas-
 sions can be, for he cites not the impassioned eloquence of some demagogue, but the af-
 fected negligence, the "air cavalier" (I. 359) of Montaigne: "la manière d'écrire de cet
 Auteur n'étant agréable, que parce qu'elle nous touche, & qu'elle réveille nos passions
 d'une manière imperceptible" (1. 360). In fact, the force of all the levels of style depends
 in the last analysis on their appeal to our fallen nature: " tous les divers stiles ne nous
 plaisent ordinairement, qu'à cause de la corruption secrette de nôtre coeur" (I. 360).
 Thus whether it is the sublime style which flatters our love of grandeur, or a delicate
 effeminate one which appeals to our desire for sensual pleasure, the will is deflected by
 passion from its pursuit of truth (I. 360-361).
 The interference of sense perceptions with the proper functioning of the understan-
 ding is the basis of Malebranche's famous description in Book II of the Recherche of the
 dangers of imaginative eloquence. When objects in the material world are perceived, a
 flow of animal spirits registers the data from the senses as tiny grooves in the brain. The
 imagination is the faculty of the understanding by which these grooves are reactivated,
 forming mental pictures of the absent object. Unfortunately, any such ideas in the ima-
 gination are only idées sensibles, and suffer from the limitations of all sense perceptions,
 that is, they are hazy and incomplete. Alone they are unable to provide any true know-
 ledge of the objects in themselves, and can at best inform about the relation of such ob-
 jects to the body. Only a second faculty of the understanding, the pure understanding,
 can go beyond this rudimentary level of experience necessary for the conservation of the
 body to an appreciation of things in themselves. Yet because such clear ideas are not re-
 lated to any mental image they are more abstract, and the will must strain to maintain
 attention on them; all too often it prefers to remain at the level of the more attractive
 sense ideas. Thus, just as impassioned eloquence, or even the "air cavalier" of Mon-
 taigne can overpower the will, rhetorical appeals to the imagination dazzle the under-
 standing. In both cases the mind's attention is the victim, and the body alone, the ma-
 chine in Cartesian parlance, is persuaded.
 Malebranche situates this mechanical persuasion in a social context where men com-
 municate chiefly at the level of the body. He pictures society as an assemblage of living
 machines, each setting the others in motion by a process of imitation. "C'est beaucoup
 plus le hazard que la Raison qui le conduit. Tous vivent d'opinion. Tous agissent par
 imitation" (XII-XIII. 128). This communication is mechanical in that it takes place un-
 consciously at the level of the body. It propagates opinion rather than truth because it
 operates uncritically without the intervention of reason. Its physiological basis is a
 common disposition in the brain which leads men to model themselves on each other:
 "Ces liens naturels, qui nous sont communs avec les bêtes, consistent dans une certaine
 disposition du cerveau qu'ont tous les hommes, pour imiter quelques-uns de ceux avec
 lesquels il conversent, pour former les mêmes jugements qu'ils font, & pour entrer dans
 les mêmes passions dont ils sont agitez" (I. 321). Humans have been endowed with this
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 tendency to facilitate the conservation of civil society, just as God has given the senses
 and passions for the preservation of the body. But the Fall left this union of men's bodies
 to each other stronger than the mutual union of their minds with God. The result is the
 false eloquence of imitation which treats men as mindless automatons, incapable of
 reflection.
 Malebranche depicts this imitation in action in a variety of situations. For example,
 the desire to please among friends of equal rank leads them to accept each other's opi-
 nions without reflection. Developing the mechanical analogy, he compares them to lu-
 tes so perfectly tuned that when a chord is struck on one, the other sounds automatically
 (XI. 205). This tendency to imitate others uncritically is even more irresistable in the
 case of superiors who are the natural object of respect. The success of English and Ger-
 man rulers in establishing national churches during the Reformation can be attributed
 to just this imitation by subjects of their monarch (I. 334-335). An entire chapter of the
 Recherche is filled with similiar examples from all stations of life of this "force de l'ima-
 gination" (1.331-340).
 The most remarkable instance of this mechanical persuasion is Malebranche's analy-
 sis of "la communication contagieuse des imaginations fortes" (I. 320 ff.), usually the
 centerpiece of any discussion of his rhetoric. It illustrates perfectly the mechanical di-
 mension of the rhetoric of imitation, based as it is on the disposition of the brains of men
 with weak imaginations to "recevoir machinalement l'impression de l'image qui les
 agite (I. 329). Such a weak imagination is activated by a strong one, a man who posses-
 ses "cette constitution du cerveau, qui le rend capable de vestiges & de traces extrême-
 ment profondes, & qui remplissent tellement la capacité de l'ame, qu'elles l'empêchent
 d'apporter quelque attention à d'autres choses, qu'à celles que ces images représen-
 tent" (1. 323). The persuasive power of such a man does not lie in an intellectual mastery
 of his topic, for indeed, the vivid images produced by his imagination make him incapa-
 ble of grasping pure ideas. The least intellectual of the five divisions of rhetoric - me-
 mory and delivery - will stand him in good stead; he has only to deliver with vigor a
 speech written by another. His power stems quite simply from his ability to transfer the
 vivid impressions produced by the agitation of animal spirits in his brain to those of his
 listeners, and for this he has no need of the rules of rhetoric: "quoique sa rhétorique soit
 souvent irréguliére, elle ne laisse pas d'être tres-persuasive" (I. 329).
 The violence of Malebranche's denunciations of strong imaginations can best be un-
 derstood when we see how their eloquence perverts both language and the whole com-
 munication process.5 Words exist, according to the Oratorian, to communicate
 thoughts, the intellectual ideas of the pure understanding: "les mots ne sont inventez
 que pour exprimer les pensées" (XI. 95). However, in the rhetoric of imitation the
 words of a strong imagination do not persuade so much as his delivery. Gestures, anima-
 tion, and tone of voice carry the principal burden of persuasion. More effective than
 words alone, this body language forms a natural language understood by all men. Facial
 5 For discussions of Malebranche's theory of language see Ginette Dreyfus, "Le fondement du
 langage dans la philosophie de Malebranche," in Le Langage, Actes du XIIIe Congrès des sociétés
 de philosophie de langue française (Neuchatel: A la baconnière 1966), pp. 137-142, and André
 Robinet, Le Langage à l'âge classique (Paris: Klincksieck, 1978), pp. 162-164.
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 expressions, body movements and the like convey a universal meaning across cultural
 boundaries, while the sign and meaning of a word in any given language are joined to-
 gether by convention. "Certainement la parole toute seule est un signe équivoque &
 trompeur dans la bouche de la pluspart des hommes. De plus comme elle est d'institu-
 tion arbitraire, elle ne persuade pas vivement les vérités qu'elle exprime . . . Mais l'air &
 les manières sont un langage naturel, qui se fait entendre sans qu'on y pense, qui per-
 suade par une vive impression, & qui répand pour ainsi dire la conviction dans les
 esprits" (XI. 255). Body language is thus at once less equivocal and more vivid than
 verbal communication, with the result that it persuades more readily, requiring less
 attention.
 Even when the words uttered by a strong imagination, rather than his delivery alone,
 have persuasive force, they are effective not as signifiers of pure ideas, but because of
 the mental images they evoke or because of the charm of their rhythm and harmony. In
 Malebranche's eyes, verbal language suffers from the same dualism which haunts hu-
 man beings, for the sound and meaning of a word are joined together arbitrarily, just as
 are the body and the mind. The mechanical persuasion of strong imaginations succeeds
 when the sensual aspect of language wins out over the sensual element in man. So potent
 is this appeal to the senses that even though Tertullian, Seneca, and Montaigne lack the
 advantage of oral delivery, their words on the printed page have a hypnotic effect,
 stronger than the reason of many of their readers: "Leurs paroles toutes mortes qu'elles
 sont, ont plus de vigueur que la raison de certaines gens. Elles entrent, elles pénètrent,
 elles dominent dans l'âme d'une manière si impérieuse, qu'elles se font obéir sans se
 faire entendre" (I. 341).
 This perversion of language is so extensive that in extreme cases the words convey no
 meaning, only the feeling of persuasion: "on se rend à leurs ordres sans les sçavoir. On
 veut croire mais on ne sçait que croire: car lorsqu'on veut sçavoir précisément ce qu'on
 croit, ou ce qu'on veut croire; & qu'on s'approche, pour ainsi dire, de ces fantômes pour
 les reconnoitre, ils s'en vont souvent en fumée avec tout leur appareil & tout leur éclat"
 (I. 341). The rhetoric of imitation produces conviction without content. It represents
 the ultimate example of the misuse of language prevalent in ordinary discourse, where
 "les paroles, dont le principal usage devroit être de représenter les idées pures de
 l'esprit, ne servent d'ordinaire qu'à exprimer des idées sensibles, & les mouvemens de
 l'ame" (XI. 136).
 II
 The temptation to resort to these appeals to the body is so pervasive that a rhetoric
 addressed to the mind might seem impossible. Even in the Entretiens, Ariste wonders
 out loud if Malebranche's mouthpiece Theodore is not guilty of just such a misuse of
 language: "Vôtre exhortation, Theodore, me paroît bien vive pour un entretien de Mé-
 taphysique. Il me semble que vous excitez en moi des sentimens, au lieu d'y faire naître
 des idées claires" (XII- XIII. 69). Ariste fears the onset of the uncritical feeling of per-
 suasion produced by the rhetoric of imitation. The first part of Theodore's defense
 seems to deny the possibility of any rhetoric at all. "Je vous dis ce que je voi, & vous ne le
 voïez pas. C'est une preuve que l'homme n'instruit pas l'homme ... Je parle à vos oreil-
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 les. Apparemment, je n'y fait que trop de bruit." Is meaningful communication through
 language above the level of the senses being denied? Not quite, for Theodore further
 explains that, while he is not Ariste's maître, he is at least his moniteur. If Ariste is not
 yet convinced, it is because "nôtre unique Maître ne parle point encore assez clairement
 à vôtre esprit: ou plutôt la Raison lui parle sans cesse fort nettement; mais faute d'atten-
 tion, vous n'entendez point assez ce qu'elle vous répond." A rhetoric appealing to the
 mind may be possible after all, if it takes into account the role of attention, the prodding
 of the moniteur, and and the action of the Maître intérieur or Universal Reason.
 If Descartes had been Malebranche's sole moniteur it is unlikely he would have envi-
 saged such a reformed rhetoric. As we have seen, the Oratorian's distrust of mechanical
 persuasion found its inspiration in the Cartesian explanation of the body /mind rela-
 tionship. Yet Malebranche found Descartes' view of this union to be radically deficient.
 The first lines of the preface of the Recherche point to a union he considered much more
 crucial - that of the mind with God. Although this union is more intimate and more es-
 sential than the mind's union with the body, Adam's Fall has weakened both the union
 itself and our awareness of it (I. 11). In addition, just as original sin weakened the
 mind's union with God, it shifted the previous equilibrium between the mind and body
 in favor of the body. For Malebranche, the mind is situated between matter and its true
 goal God, with the balance in favor of the body since the Fall. The stakes are far from
 merely epistemological; man's salvation is also in question: "L'esprit devient plus pur,
 plus lumineux, plus fort & plus étendu à proportion que s'augmente l'union qu'il a avec
 Dieu; parce que c'est elle qui fait toute sa perfection. Au contraire il se corrompt, il
 s'aveugle, il s'affoiblit, & il se resserre à mesure que l'union qu'il a avec son corps s'aug-
 mente & se fortifie; parce que cette union fait aussi toute son imperfection" (1. 15-16).
 Given this perspective, rhetoric is not just the rather futile instrument that it was for
 Descartes who was much more interested in his philosophic method; in Malebranche's
 eyes, a rhetoric of imitation separates man from God: witness the vain stoicism of a
 Seneca or the worldly Pyrrhonism of a Montaigne.
 Malebranche's more positive views on persuasion depend on his theory of the union
 of the mind with God, and it was to Augustine that he turned for inspiration here, not so
 much to the Augustine of rhetorical treatises like the fourth book of De Doctrina Chri-
 stiana, but to philosophic texts like De Magistro. If we examine the Oratorian's rhetoric
 in terms of epistemology it might be called a rhetoric of attention ; if we approach it from
 a religious perspective it is a rhetoric of the Incarnation. Both are opposite sides of the
 same coin.6
 6 Detailed comparisons of Malebranche's views with those of his contemporaries are beyond the
 scope of this article. Two brief examples, however, will illustrate what I believe to be his depth and
 subtlety. His perennial opponent Antoine Arnauld cites the Incarnation in his Réflexions sur V élo-
 quence in order to justify the use of the sensible in sermons {Œuvres, XLII, Paris: Sigismond D'Ar-
 nay, 1781, 385-386), but more to show that we need the imagination to envisage dogmas like the
 Incarnation than, as Malebranche does, to provide a rationale for using the sensible to illuminate
 the intelligible. One of his disciples, Bernard Lamy, includes a chapter in his Art de parler on the
 need to excite attention (Amsterdam: Paul Marrey, 1699, pp. 324-325), but his comments are
 somewhat banal ones about the necessity of holding the interest of the audience, rather than being
 grounded in a theory such as vision in God.
 2*
 20 Thomas M. Can
 Malebranche is quite capable of using the word attention in a conventional manner,
 as when he confesses to having discussed Tertullian and the others because he expected
 that their famous names "seroient capables d'exciter l'attention des Lecteurs" (III.
 119). Usually, however, the term includes a technical meaning, so pivotal that Pierre
 Blanchard has identified it as the central element in the Oratorian's thought.7 For Ma-
 lebranche, attention is more than just the intense application of the mind to the problem
 at hand which Descartes described in the ninth rule of the Regulae. 8 Malebranche calls
 attention "une prière naturelle, par laquelle nous obtenons, que la Raison nous éclaire"
 (XL 60). Each time the attention is focused, the mind is in effect addressing God to
 whom it is attached and in whom all truth is seen. An act of attention is a kind of uncons-
 cious prayer that God will enlighten the mind. Without it no natural truth can be known.
 Attention is no easy thing to maintain. It is "ce combat de l'esprit contre les impres-
 sions du corps" (XII-XIII. 32). It requires both sustained intellectual concentration in
 the face of distractions offered by the body and the refusal to accept all the commonly
 held notions about the world of experience which do not hold up under attentive exami-
 nation. The rhetoric of imitation settles for just such opinions when the exhausted mind
 takes refuge in the probable, instead of pursuing the évidence which is the sign of truth
 (XL 21).
 If the fraility of human attention is a consequence of original sin (XII.- XIII. 76), the
 Incarnation is the divine response. The Raison universelle, the Maître intérieur, to whom
 acts of attention are addressed is the Logos of John's gospel. Realizing that man in his
 fallen state could never attain all the truth of which he was capable by his attention alo-
 ne, the Logos became incarnate. "La Raison ne s'est incarnée que pour conduire par les
 sens les hommes à la Raison" (XL 35). The Conversations chrétiennes cite Christ's use
 of miracles, parables, and "comparaisons familières" (IV. 112) as examples of this in-
 struction through the senses. Although numerous texts show the Incarnation itself to be
 a rhetorical act, as God's way of using the senses to draw man's attention to higher
 truth,9 the most explicit passage goes on to present the Incarnation as the model for hu-
 man eloquence: "Je dis qu'il faut exposer aux autres la vérité, comme la vérité même
 s'est exposée. Les hommes depuis le péché de leur père, ayant la vûë trop foible pour
 considérer la vérité en elle-même, cette souveraine vérité s'est rendue sensible en se
 couvrant de nôtre humanité, afin d'attirer nos regards, de nous éclairer, & de se rendre
 aimable à nos yeux. Ainsi on peut à son exemple couvrir de quelque chose de sensible
 les véritez que nous voulons comprendre & enseigner aux autres, afin d'arrêter l'esprit
 qui aime le sensible, & qui ne se prend aisément que par quelque chose qui flatte les
 sens. La Sagesse éternelle s'est rendue sensible, mais non dans l'éclat: elle s'est rendue
 sensible, non pour nous arrêter au sensible, mais pour nous élever à l'intelligible" (IL
 260-26 1). I will center my discussion of the rhetoric of attention around three points il-
 lustrated in this passage. First, the Incarnation justifies taking into account the position
 and psychology of the audience; second, it authorizes the use of the senses and passions
 7 Pierre Blanchard, L'Attention à Dieu selon Malebranche (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1956).
 8 See for example L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes: A Study of the Regulae (Oxford: At the
 Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 56-58.
 9 On the Incarnation as a rhetorical act, see III. 146-147; IV. 112; XII-XIII. 121.
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 which had been so decried in the rhetoric of imitation; yet, finally, the limits and dangers
 of the sensible are never forgotten.
 Malebranche's conviction that there is only one Raison universelle speaking with a
 single voice to all who will listen does not prevent a keen appreciation of the need to
 adapt to each particular audience. Just as God accomodated himself to man by taking on
 a body, so proofs must be chosen which are acceptable to each audience: "il est permis à
 la Chine de tirer de Confucius Philosophe du Païs des preuves de la vérité de nos Dog-
 mes . . . pour persuader promptement les gens, il faut nécessairement leur parler selon
 leurs idées, un langage qu'ils entendent bien, et qu'ils écoutent volontiers" (IV. 4). Ma-
 lebranche recommends as a first step familiarizing oneself with the audience, "Avant
 que de parler tâche de connoître la force et la capacité de ceux qui t'écoutent" (X. 204),
 and he offers a series of hints on psychological strategies to use with a variety of audien-
 ces: those disposed to truth (X. 205); esprits forts (XL 39), with whom equivocal terms
 should be avoided; and heretics, who must be taught to distrust their own· judgment (I.
 396).
 The dialogues themselves illustrate how to deal with an audience which manifests "un
 fort grand amour de la vérité" (X. 205). One can expose one's thoughts directly, no
 matter how abstract the principles may be: "leur amour de la vérité leur donnera l'att-
 ention, & l'attention fera naître en eux la lumière" (X. 205). Yet persuasion is seldom
 this easy. In all three dialogues, once the willing learner has mastered the fundamentals
 of Malebranche's system, the discussion turns to how to convert others. With those who
 have only "quelque amour pour la vérité" (X. 205) or who are even scoffers, different
 tactics are in order. "Interroge, mais en Disciple, afin que l'amour propre renouvelle &
 fortifie l'attention. Approuve ce qu'il y a de bon dans les réponses qu'on te rend, sans
 faire d'abord attention au reste. Découvre la vérité de manière qu'on s'imagine soi-
 même la découvrir, fais en sorte qu'avec toi tout le monde ait de l'esprit. Attribue aux
 autres des pensées solides, qu'ils n'expriment qu'à demi, & qu'ils n'ont peut-être pas.
 Afin que l'homme aime la vérité, il faut qu'elle lui appartienne, & qu'elle le touche: il
 faut la regarder comme une production de son esprit" (X. 205). Malebranche acknow-
 ledges the element of manipulation here, calling it elsewhere, a "charitable dissimula-
 tion" (XII-XIII. 317). He goes so far as to suggest playing the devil's advocate: "Mais
 lorsque vous aurez reconnu que la vérité les pénètre, alors combattez-la sans craindre
 qu'ils l'abandonnent. Ils la regarderont comme un bien qui leur appartient" (XII-XIII.
 317). He shows no qualms about using ad hominem arguments which he himself finds
 weak: "On peut même, pour persuader une vérité constante, se servir d'une preuve très
 foible, lorsque ceux qu'on veut instruire, la trouvent bonne; & qu'elle est convaincante
 pour eux, qu'une autre seroit démonstrative, s'ils pouvoient en comprendre la force"
 (XVI. 155-156). In such cases audience adaptation is clearly not grounded in respect
 for the other's position. Instead it means accomodating oneself to a perceived weakness,
 and Malebranche justifies any deception by comparing himself to a doctor treating a
 self-indulgent patient: "lors que un malade aime son mal, il faut le tromper pour le
 guérir" (X. 204).
 Just the same, in the context of the theory of vision in God, the deception implied in a
 recommendation like "il faut toujours ... les (the others) instruire en sorte qu'ils s'ima-
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 ginent nous régenter" (IV. 58) is less manipulative than it might seem. Neither partici-
 pant is a true teacher, for as we have seen, "l'homme n'instruit pas l'homme." They are
 not maîtres but moniteurs, who serve to excite the attention to the true Maître intérieur,
 the sole source of truth. In the final analysis, each person must discover truth for himself
 by focusing his attention on the common source of Divine Wisdom.
 If the Incarnation is a rhetorical act using the sensible to make known the intelligible,
 it justifies the use of sense perceptions and the passions, either to strengthen the atten-
 tion, or to fortify the will's resolve to do good. Malebranche in fact devotes several chap-
 ters in the fifth book of the Recherche to showing how the senses and passions can re-
 medy our limited capacity for attention to pure ideas. He does, however, take care to re-
 commend the least addictive of these remedies. He suggests the imagination, which as
 the perception of absent objects does not engage the understanding so deeply as direct
 sense perception (II. 262), and admiration, which of all the passions affects the heart the
 least (II. 204).
 The examples in the Recherche, like diagrams in geometry or the passion for learning
 among scholars, deal with the discovery of truth more than its communication, with
 science more than rhetoric. Just the same, he took care to note that the sensible does
 have a legitimate role in a major arena of seventeenth-century eloquence, questions of
 morals or religion. In an important addition, published in 1678 in the ninth éclaircisse-
 ment to the Recherche, he reaffirms his attack on what he considered false eloquence,
 while adding a crucial concession. Nojting that Tertullian, for all his stylistic excess, was
 wise not to write like a geometer, he says, "Les figures qui expriment nos sentimens &
 nos movemens, à l'égard des veritez que nous exposons aux autres, sont absolument né-
 cessaires. Et je croi que principalement dans les discours de Religion & de Morale, l'on
 doit se servir d'ornemens qui fassent rendre à la vérité tout le respect qui lui est dû, & de
 mouvemens qui agitent l'ame & la portent à des actions vertueuses" (III. 126). Just the
 same, he is none too specific about recommending technical devices to this end. Here
 the broad category of "ornemens" can probably be identified with the whole range of
 tropes appealing to the imagination. His own use of similes to clarify abstract concepts
 in his philosophy comes to mind - for example, the comparison of the mind to a ball of
 wax to explain how pure and sensible ideas modify it, or the image of rain falling on both
 fields and uncultivated areas to illustrate the distribution of grace to the just and unjust.
 His reference to "figures" refers to the affective elements of persuasion, especially to
 the figures of speech, which contemporary rhetorical theory considered expressive of
 the emotions. Comments elsewhere make clear he had in mind a sort of ethical proof, in
 which the speaker communicates his own emotional reaction to his message by stirring
 up in himself the emotions he wishes to impart to his audience: "Excite donc d'abord en
 toi-même les mouvements que la vérité y doit faire naître, & expose ensuite tes senti-
 mens sans te contraindre. Il faut que tu sois pénétré pour toucher les autres" (X. 205).
 Finally, the Incarnation indicates the limits of emotional and imaginative persuasion,
 which must be used with prudence so as not to distract the soul from its true goal. Just as
 Christ chose to appear sans éclat, eloquence should not so dazzle the mind that higher
 truth is forgotten (II. 261). Almost every passage in which Malebranche counsels the
 passions or imagination as aids to attention also contains a caveat against being carried
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 away by them. His fear of mechanical persuasion tempers every passage favorable to
 traditional rhetoric. For example, despite its approval of appeals to the emotions, the
 ninth éclaircissement ends with a double warning to both speaker and audience: "II ne
 faut pas convaincre ni se laisser convaincre sans sçavoir évidemment, distinctement,
 précisément de quoi on convainc, ou de quoi on est convaincu" (III. 126). The emotions
 can only be a supplement to rational proof, never a substitute.
 In this rhetoric of attention, the sensual appeal of language, which dominated in the
 rhetoric of imitation, no longer is the chief agent of persuasion. Since a word's sound is
 only an arbitrary sign for Malebranche, it can lead to truth only in so far as it directs the
 attention to the Maître intérieur. As Ariste indicated in the Entretiens , he is not persuad-
 ed by what Theodore has said, but by the testimony of interior truth. "Oui, maintenant
 je suis convaincu, non par la force de vos discours, mais par les réponses évidentes de la
 vérité intérieure" (XII-XIII. 88). For those who know how to consult this inner voice
 there is no need to spell out every argument word for word, "Ceux qui rentrent dans
 eux-mêmes pour y écouter la vérité intérieure, and pour étudier les lois éternelles, com-
 prennent à demi mot des choses qui paroissent incompréhensibles aux autres hommes"
 (XVII, part 1, 413). At the point where evidence is finally achieved language becomes
 irrevelant.10 Pierre Blanchard points out that the attention by which certainty is obtain-
 ed is only a first step, "un premier contact avec la vérité, contact toujours, précaire et
 fragile qui s'intériorise en réflexion" (p. 27). This évidence must be further internalized
 by reflection and meditation where language plays an even more reduced role. In the
 dialogues Ariste does not profess to be persuaded immediately upon hearing Theodo-
 re's arguments, but only after having a full day to reflect on them and to consult the
 Maître intérieur. Language has become a prelude to silence in true Augustinian
 fashion.11
 This is not the least of the paradoxes found in Malebranche's views on rhetoric and
 persuasion. On the one hand, his adherence to the Cartesian ideal of the overwhelming
 évidence of clear and distinct ideas would seem to eliminate all need for rhetoric. At the
 most one might expect the limited rhetoric of a moniteur who aids others to focus their
 attention, free from the distractions of the senses and passions. Such a modest role
 might be possible with an audience composed of the intellectual elite found in the Entre-
 tiens of the likes of Ariste, who is relatively free of prejudice, the passions, and other
 marks of concupiscence which restrict the capacity for attention; yet in real life, one is
 seldom faced with such an ideal audience, and Malebranche accepts that the moniteur
 must become a rhetor, using the senses, the passions, amour-propre, and even strategies
 some might call sophistic, to strengthen the attention, at least up to the point at which
 the dispassionate consultation of the Maître intérieur can begin.
 Unfortunately, the dividing line between the legitimate rhetorical use of the senses
 and false eloquence is hazy. Clearly, false eloquence is the use of rhetorical devices in
 the service of error, but is it not as well for Malebranche any discourse on behalf of truth
 10 Robinet, p. 165.
 11 In his essay "St. Augustine's Rhetoric of Silence: Truth vs. Eloquence and Things vs. Signs," in
 Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Studies (New York: Columbia University Press. 1964),
 Joseph A. Mazzeo points out that in De Doctrina, "true rhetoric culminates in silence, in which the
 mind is in immediate contact with reality" p. 17.
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 which persuades the body rather than the mind, which settles for sensible persuasion
 rather than évidence? Yet, since évidence has a personal, subjective dimension, can the
 monitor/rhetor ever be entirely sure that the persuasion he obtains is grounded in intel-
 lectual assent rather than merely in the senses? It was just this unresolved tension in Ma-
 lebranche 's comments on persuasion which led some of his disciples like François Lamy
 to elaborate the Oratorian's attack on false eloquence into a condemnation of rhetoric,
 while others like Henri Lelevel and Bernard Lamy defended and taught it.12
 The existence of such tensions should not obscure the fact that the implications for
 rhetoric of Malebranche's system are not as negative as have been supposed. To be sure,
 he had little interest in the rules of the art as it was taught in his day, and he scarely ever
 alludes to the traditional categories and apparatus. Yet he was vitally interested with
 persuasion both as a philosopher and a Christian, and he deals with fundamental con-
 cerns of rhetoricians, such as the recognition of the need for strategies determined by
 the audience's psychology and beliefs, and for ethical and emotional proofs as well as
 reasoned ones. Moreover, these concerns find a theoretical rationale in a concept cen-
 tral to his thought, the Incarnation - a doctrine with epistemological as well as religious
 implications for him. The fact that the Maître intérieur, the Raison universelle, became
 flesh legitimizes the rhetorical use of the sensible to reach the intelligible. Finally, his
 analysis of the rhetoric of imitation with its emphasis on automatic responses is rich with
 insights into techniques of nonverbal suggestion and unconscious persuasion.
 Like Plato, who also has a reputation for an aversion to rhetoric, Malebranche
 tempered much of his hostility. Unfortunately, this more positive attitude has been ne-
 glected because the Oratorian never saw fit to give prominence to his views in his own
 Phaedrus, combining his Cartesian and Augustinian heritage.
 12 François Lamy, De la connaissance de soy -même (Paris: Pralard, 1694-1698); Henri Lelevel,
 La Philosophie moderne par demandes et par réponses, avec un traité de l'art de persuader (Tou-
 louse: G. L. Colomiez, 1698). For Bernard Lamy see note 6. Tocanne's book summarizes these
 works.
